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Abstract
This study investigates the extent and the determinants of tunnelling behaviour in five
ASEAN countries (i.e. Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand). Related
party transactions (RPTs) in the form of loans to related parties are used as the proxy for
tunnelling. With 200 firm-year observations over the period 2006-2009, this study finds a
positive association between managerial ownership and the extent of tunnelling.
The other important findings are that business environment (BE), foreign ownership,
and independent directors are ineffective governance mechanisms to rein in tunnelling
behaviour. This suggests that regulators need to evolve more effective governance
mechanisms.
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Introduction
Based on a synthesised corporate governance theoretical framework, i.e. agency and resource
dependence theory, this study provides a longitudinal international analysis – spanning five
ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) – of the extent
and determinants of tunnelling. The term tunnelling relates to efforts of controlling
shareholders of parent firms to exploit minority shareholders by siphoning off firm’s
economic resources (Johnson et al. 2000). Tunnelling is particularly serious in emerging
economies due to poor corporate governance systems that fail to protect minority
shareholders and corporate ownership structures that promote expropriation opportunistic
behaviour (e.g. Aharony et al. 2010; Bae et al. 2002; Bai et al. 2004; Bertrand et al. 2002;
Claessens et al. 2000; Friedman et al. 2003; Liu & Lu 2007). Many researchers (e.g.
Claessens et al. 2000; Gao & Kling 2008; La Porta et al. 1999; Liu & Lu 2007) claim that the
Asian tunnelling problem is assisted by weak corporate governance systems and concentrated
ownership structures. For instance, they argue that unrestrained tunnelling was the main
reason precipitating the 1997–1999 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC).
Though various methods of tunnelling have been suggested, much of the empirical
research focuses on RPTs 3. Weak corporate governance systems and prevailing corporate
structures in many nations worldwide, provide a great scope for RPTs to be a convenient
mechanism for the expropriation of firm value from minority shareholders (Cheung et al.
2006; Cheung et al 2009; Gao & Kling 2008; Liu & Lu 2007) There is a view that RPTs are a
high risk factor for investors (Cheung, Rau & Stouraitis 2006; Cheung et al. 2009; Kohlbeck
& Mayhew 2010). Abusive RPTs have increasingly become a challenge to the integrity of the
Asian capital market (OECD 2009).
An overwhelming theme of prior empirical tunnelling research is the varying
influence of corporate governance, whether at the national or firm-level. In the present
globalised BE, ‘corporate governance’ is a frequently used catch-phrase sometimes used as
an all-encompassing concept but at other times cast in a very narrow frame of reference.
Though there has been much corporate governance debate in recent decades, the underlying
concept is not well understood with a lack of consensus on a formal definition and conceptual
boundaries. At a national-level, legal systems and investor protection are merely components
of a broader system. Meanwhile, ownership structure is also a single facet of a broader range
of firm-level corporate governance mechanisms. Further adding to the complexity of the
issue is that within the concept of ownership structure, alternative structural combinations
(e.g. levels of foreign, family or governmental ownership) can impact on ownership structure
as an effective corporate governance mechanism. The complexity of corporate governance
raises a number of unanswered and interesting questions in relation to tunnelling. Two are of
prime interest to this study. These are: (1) Does the broader national-level corporate
governance system influence the extent of tunnelling? (2) Do different ownership types (that
constitute a firm’s general ownership structure) influence the extent of tunnelling? This study
addresses these issues in the context of Southeast Asia countries.
3

RPTs do not always have negative consequences. Studies ( Cheung et al. 2009; Khanna & Palepu 1997; Kim
2004) argue that certain group structures and RPTs among member firms help to reduce transaction costs and
overcome difficulties in enforcing property rights and contracts essential for production. Indeed, firms may
make strategic investments in joint ventures to obtain and secure access to supplies and markets, and to manage
risk. Transactions between the firm and related parties also generally involve less information asymmetry
compared with transactions between a firm and a third party (Kohlbeck & Mayhew 2010). Djankov et al. (2008)
note nations around the world do not completely ban RPTs, thereby, supporting the notion RPTs can be value
enhancing.
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This study utilises OLS regression in its main analysis by using 200 firm-year
observations data of listed firms from five ASEAN countries. Findings show evidence of a
positive association between managerial ownership and tunnelling via RPTs. The other
important findings are that BE, foreign ownership, and independent directors are not effective
in mitigatng tunnelling behaviour. Moreover, countries’ legal systems and firm size clearly
influence the extent of tunnelling. This paper offers insights via cross country study of
tunnelling behaviour by ASEAN listed firms over the GFC period.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews the
related literature and develops the hypotheses. The third section outlines the research
approach of the study with discussion of results in fourth section. The paper concludes with
key implications.
Literature Review and Hypotheses
Previous Studies on Tunnelling
Prior empirical research of RPT tunnelling has mostly been country specific, with many
recent studies focusing on firms listed in the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) (e.g. Cheung
et al. 2006; Cheung et al. 2009; Guo 2008; Jian & Wong 2003; Jiang et al. 2010; Li 2010; Liu
& Lu 2007). The PRC has been of major interest due to their unique institutional and
corporate structures, and the detailed RPTs their firms are required to report (Aharony et al.
2010). In the PRC, the majority of firms are carve-outs (or spin-offs) from state-owned
enterprises (SOEs), and often continue to share personnel functions, capital, and assets with
the parent entity (Liu & Lu 2007; Ge et al. 2010). Consequently, it is alleged corporate
management of the PRC firms often take action benefitting the largest shareholders (i.e.
government).
Empirical research using the PRC firms generally highlight the existence of tunnelling
(Jian & Wong 2003). Liu and Lu (2004) conclude that earnings management amongst the
PRC firms is primarily induced by controlling shareholders tunnelling resources. Cheung et
al. (2005) find minority shareholders in firm conducting RPTs with SOEs are left
significantly worse off than counterparts in non-SOEs. Aharony et al. (2010) note PRC
issuers are likely to use operational tunnelling to opportunistically manage earnings upward
in the pre-initial public offering (IPO) period, and that pre-IPO period operational tunnelling
is motivated in part by the prospect of opportunistic tunnelling in the post-IPO period.
Outside of the PRC, there is generally a paucity of empirical research of tunnelling in
other national contexts. Nonetheless, evidence suggests tunnelling transcends international
boundaries. Evidence of resource expropriation to benefit majority shareholders (i.e.
tunnelling) is found in nation-specific studies of firms in Bulgaria (Atanasov 2005), Hong
Kong (Cheung et al. 2006), India (Bertrand et al. 2002), Japan (Weinstein & Yafeh 1998),
Russia (Atanasov et al. 2006), South Korea (Bae et al. 2002; Baek et al. 2006), Sweden
(Bergstrom & Rydqvist 1990) and the United States (Atanasov et al. 2006). Whilst the
dominant view is that tunnelling is relatively widespread, empirical evidence of tunnelling is
not universal. Chang and Shin (2007), for example, see no clear evidence of tunnelling
amongst a sample of South Korean conglomerates (i.e. chaebols).
To date the overwhelming focus of empirical research is focused on detecting
tunnelling, with few studies formally examining possible determinants. Of the international
tunnelling studies conducted to date (Friedman et al. 2003; Glaeser et al. 2001; Johnson et al.
2000), it is commonly argued legal system differences and variations in investor protection
are key determinants of tunnelling. Johnson et al.’s (2000) study of European tunnelling cases
state that “potential differences between civil and common law countries in how courts
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approach tunnelling cases” (Johnson et al, 2000, p26) affected actions to expropriate
resources from minority shareholders. Friedman et al. (2003) find “strong empirical evidence
that entrepreneurs tunnel resources out of firms in countries with weak investor
protection”(Friedman et al. 2003, p748).
At a firm level, the overwhelming focus is on ownership structure spanning variations
of the majority ownership versus minority ownership theme; i.e.: (a) pyramid group structure,
(b) large block holder versus minority shareholders, or (c) family-owned block versus nonfamily minority shareholders. Bertrand et al. (2002), for example, provide evidence of
tunnelling in Indian business groups whereby cash flows from firms lower in the pyramid to
higher level firms where the controlling groups have greater ownership rights. Gao and Kling
(2008), meanwhile, find cash flows with the entity is higher where the founding family
continues to maintain controlling interest.
Four predictive variables are explored in this study as possible influencing factors of
tunnelling activities. The first is national corporate governance (BE) and the remaining three
are various aspects of key ownership structures (family, managerial and foreign).
Business Environment (BE) and RPTs Tunnelling
The national-level corporate governance system is an important focus of this study. A
nation’s BE is considered to be fundamental in determining the national-level corporate
governance system. These systems in turn impact on tunnelling behaviour.
To better determine the impact of a national-level corporate governance system on
tunnelling, a synthesised framework of the four major theoretical perspectives of corporate
governance is utilised. The four major theories are: agency theory, resource dependence
theory, stakeholder theory and institutional theory (Udayasankar et al. 2007). The first two
theories aid in establishing a nation’s competitive BE whilst the latter two underpin the
regulatory business environment (RBE). The BE is a product of its competitive and
regulatory environments.
The rawest, and most basic, objective of a firm is to develop a sustainable competitive
advantage and remain a viable going-concern. Agency theory holds an implicit number of
assumptions. One important assumption postulated suggests inefficient firms (i.e. firms with
high levels of agency costs) face threats from competitors in the BE through the advent of the
market for corporate control (Jensen and Ruback 1983). Agency theory presumes an efficient
and competitive business environment (CBE) prevails where asymmetrical information is
minimal and competitive pressures high. In contrast to agency theory, resource dependence
theory focuses on human resource capabilities of actors within the corporate governance
structure and the resulting impact on firm performance. Resource dependence theory argues a
firm can benefit strategically from board capital that ultimately implies an organisation is
efficient. The general proposition upheld by resource dependence advocates is that firms
benefit from human capital (i.e. skills and strengths of the directors); this presumes the
presence of a reasonably efficient labour market (e.g. Dalton et al. 1999; Hillman & Dalziel
2003). Similarly, relational capital, such as channels of communication, is likely to enhance
firm value in cases when the channels of communication offer a firm a competitive edge over
competitors. Overall, assumptions inherent in agency and resource dependence theories are
best achieved in a BE highlighting principles of perfect competition (Udayasankar et al.
2005). Competitive dynamics researchers argue motivation and capability are two prime
drivers of a firm’s competitiveness and efficiency (e.g. Gimeno 1999; He & Mahoney 2006).
That is, agency theory assists to explain how corporate governance influence the motivation
of corporate management to select optimal decisions in the distribution and use of free cash
flows that enhances shareholder wealth, whereas resource dependence theory stresses the
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capability of a firm’s corporate governance to enhance the undertaking of key strategic
competitive actions.
For the RBE, arguably stakeholder theory and institutional theory are most relevant.
Stakeholder theory advocates (Donaldson & Preston 1995; Hillman & Keim 2001; Roberts
1992) argue that even in the most expansive form of social responsibility, corporate
management sees stakeholder management as having a positive contribution toward firm
value (Owen & Scherer 1993).
Institutional theory suggests firm value is best derived by the firm being in
consonance with its institutional environment (e.g. Arthur 2003; Hart & Milstein 2003;
Oliver 1997). These arguments have found support with prior empirical research (e.g. Lee &
Pennings 2002; Thornton 2002) that suggest institutional pressures influence a firm’s value.
Advocates of institutional theory (in the same vein as supporters of stakeholder theory) stress
the importance of regulation within the BE. Researchers have identified various institutional
pressures that influence the regulatory aspects of the BE such as the legal system (e.g. La
Porta et al. 1997, 1998, 2002), trade agreements (e.g. Levy & Prakash 2003), social cooperatives and state ownership (Shleifer & Vishny 1997). Other empirical evidence of the
impact of institutional factors is widespread. Wurgler (2000), meanwhile, finds strong
institutional structures prevent overinvestment in declining, unproductive industries and
firms. Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) show institutional actors can prevent negative
financial accounting practices such as earnings management.
Impromptu corporate governance mechanisms evolve out of competitive pressures
between firms and an incentive for a firm to differentiate itself from competitors
(Chakrabarti 2008). On this basis, the CBE is closely associated with corporate governance
practices and standards; and, therefore, agency theory and resource dependence theory
(Udayasankar & Das 2007). In a strong and efficient CBE, firms will be under pressure to
conform to business-derived corporate governance norms and standards. Furthermore, firms
have an incentive to regularly update and develop alternative corporate governance
mechanisms so they can be differentiated from competitors. A firm failing to conform with
corporate governance practices and standards in a strong and efficient CBE is likely to be
punished (e.g. loss of value) by investors and providers of key resources (e.g. labour, material
suppliers). In a weak and inefficient CBE the fear of being punished by investors and key
resource providers will be diminished (La Porta et al. 1998, 1999). Consequently, firms have
little incentive to conform and develop new corporate governance practices and standards.
Overall, a strong and efficient CBE is likely to provide firms less scope and opportunities to
tunnel resources away from minority shareholders via RPTs. As regulatory efficiency (a key
assumption of institutional and stakeholder theories of corporate governance) increases,
various coercive forces will pressure firms to develop corporate governance mechanisms that
conform to practices and standards legislated and enforced by the nation’s regulatory
framework, and that benefit organisational legitimacy and effect (Udayasankar & Das 2007).
In a highly efficient RBE, therefore, a firm is likely to have less scope and incentive to adopt
practices and conventions (such as those expropriating resources from minority shareholders)
for fear it will draw unwanted regulatory and political attention. Given strong CBE and RBE
will diminish opportunities for RPTs tunnelling, it is hypothesised:
H1: There is a negative association between the strength of a nation’s BE and the
extent of tunnelling via RPTs.
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Ownership Structure
This section outlines prior research considering the influence of three key ownership structure
features (i.e. family, managerial and foreign) on accounting issues. Based on this review
testable hypotheses addressing the association with tunnelling via RPTs are formed.
Various ownership patterns exist across economies. Dispersed shareholdings
supported by a well-functioning legal and regulatory framework have provided an efficient
base for capital accumulation (La Porta et al. 1999; Shleifer & Vishny 1997;). A recent
stream of literature brings into question the assumption of diffused ownership and suggests in
many economies that concentrated ownership is more typical (Anderson & Reeb 2003;
Claessens et al. 2000; La Porta et al. 1998, 1999). In East Asia, concentrated ownership in the
form of family ownership dominates other types of ownership (Claessens et al. 2000). Family
ownership has an informal powerful influence on the way that organisation are run, with
positive and negative outcome (Schulze, Lubatkin & Dino 2003). Family control may reduce
agency cost by helping to align ownership with control ( Fama & Jensen 1983; Jensen &
Meckling 1976). On the other hand, family control may increase the likelihood of
expropriation of non-family minority shareholders and can harm performance (Bloom & Van
Reenen 2006). A concentrated pattern of ownership potentially allows insiders to have tighter
control over the firm, however it also creates opportunities to expropriate wealth from other
shareholders (Faccio, Lang & Young 2001; Villalonga & Amit 2006). A more common
occurrence, a family controlled entity, uses a variety of means to transfer a significant
proportion of free cash flows from a company in which they have small cash flow rights into
a company in which they have large cash flow rights and control (Johnson et al. 2000).
Controlling shareholders could transfer wealth, or get special benefits, by self-dealing
transactions between the controlling shareholders and the controlled firms (Gilson & Gordon
2003).
Guo (2008) reveals that the presence of controlling shareholders and higher control
rights leads to higher levels of tunnelling via RPTs. In a similar spirit, Li (2010) investigates
tunnelling by controlling shareholders in China’s public firms, and finds that tunnelling is
pervasive and severe. Given that many listed firms characterised by family controlling
shareholders are common in Southeast Asia, this study assumes that the higher percentage of
family ownership, the higher the tunnelling threats. Accordingly, these arguments lead to the
following hypothesis:
H2: There is a positive association between a firm’s family ownership and the extent
of tunnelling via RPTs.
Warfield, Wild and Wild (1995) document that higher CEO stock ownership helps
alleviate some of the agency problems that arise in corporation by aligning the interest of
manager and shareholders. As long as managers are minority shareholders, their ownership
role might also mitigate the danger of tunnelling (Gao & Kling 2008; Liu & Lu 2007). On the
other hand, Klein (2002) finds a positive correlation between CEO shareholdings and
earnings management, which is consistent with recent events and accounting scandals. If the
CEO manages earnings to increase their overall compensation, then there will be a positive
relation between CEO shareholdings and earnings management (Klein 2002). This indirectly
indicates the possibility of expropriation. Morck, Shleifer & Vishny(1988) suggest that high
shareholding by top managements may cause moral hazard and information asymmetry
problems between the inside (management and directors) and outside investors. In a similar
vein, Santiago-Castro and Brown (2011) find a positive association between CEO ownership
and the potential for expropriation of minority shareholders’ rights. Thus, managerial
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shareholdings appear to lower the level of monitoring that may negatively affect minority
shareholders, without the presence of other internal corporate governance mechanisms. Their
finding supports the agency theory argument that when managers’ shareholdings grow as a
fraction of personal wealth, their interest becomes more aligned with the majority shareholder
(Jensen & Meckling 1976; Weisbach 1988). As manager shareholdings increase, their
objectives more closely match those of the controlling shareholder, and consequently
minority shareholders may lose an important monitoring device for good corporate
governance. Gibson (2003) also suggests that minority investors in emerging markets
controlled by a large shareholder, i.e. family, should be aware that managers may favour the
large shareholder at the expense of the minority shareholders. This discussion leads to the
following hypothesis:
H3: There is a positive association between a firm’s managerial ownership and the
extent of tunnelling via RPTs.
Foreign ownership can be seen as one effective mechanism that can complement the
current governance structure in order to monitor the management from non-value maximising
activities (Dahlquist & Robertsson 2001). Foreign investors may also have better monitoring
capabilities, which can help firms to move away from an over-reliance on concentrated
ownership (Khanna & Palepu 2000). Djankov and Murrell (2002) find in their extensive
survey of the research on transition economies that when investment funds, foreigners, and
other outsiders become influential owners, ten times as much restructuring takes place in
former SOEs.
Young et al. (2008) suggest the important role of foreign ownership such as foreign
institutional investors in institutional reform. They further state that as emerging economies
become more open, this exposure to outside ideas and influence will likely accelerate
governance reforms. Foreign institutional investors are outside the domestic social networks
from which the institutional norms of behaviour are generated, and they are therefore more
likely to push for transparent deals and pressure governments to improve minority
shareholder protection (Peng 2003). In other words, they may be more pressure-resistant to
locally-generated principal-principal problems (Kochhar & David 1996; Tihanyi et al. 2003).
Demands for transparency imply reducing asymmetry information and consequently, prevent
opportunistic behaviour. Similarly, increased protection of minority shareholders by
governments creates a pressure for firms to act in ways not detrimental to minority
shareholders. This study expects that the higher foreign ownership can improve firm
monitoring function against opportunistic behaviour including tunnelling. Hence:
H4: There is a negative association between a firm’s foreign ownership and the extent
of tunnelling via RPTs.
In summary, four corporate governance mechanisms (BE, family ownership,
managerial ownership, and foreign ownership) are hypothesised as possible predictors of
tunnelling via RPTs.
Research Approach
This study uses a sample of publicly traded firms listed on the stock exchange in five ASEAN
countries from 2006-2009 4. The total data set is 200 firm-year observations. Ten firms are
randomly chosen in each country and observed over four years. The selected ASEAN
countries sample are Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Philippines. These five
4

Financial firms are excluded from the sample since they are under a different regulatory regime.
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countries are picked because they all have established stock exchanges with sufficient
English language information including full comprehensive annual reports. Moreover, these
ASEAN countries are the chosen focus because they traditionally have weaker corporate
governance systems but higher ownership concentration resulting in higher problems with
tunnelling and expropriation by majority owners (Claessens & Fan 2002; Claessens et al.
2000; Gao & Kling 2008;Haw et al. 2004; Liu & Lu 2007; Peng, Wei & Yang, 2011).
By way of determinants of tunnelling, this study focuses on examining the influence
of the national corporate governance business system and the firm-level ownership structure.
In respect to the national corporate governance system, this study concentrates on BE and
competitive and regulatory structures. As for firm-level ownership structure, the study
considers three features: (a) family ownership; (b) managerial ownership; and (c) foreign
ownership levels. All RPTs data as well as ownership data and other financial data are
gathered from firm financial statements and annual reports. Those data are collected from the
ORBIS database and stock exchange websites in each sample country.
To analyse the extent of tunnelling, this study uses RPTs as a proxy. Jian and Wong
(2003) suggest that lending transactions to RPTs are commonly referred to as financial
tunnelling. Jiang, Lee and Yue (2005) document robust evidence that ‘other receivables’
largely represent corporate loans extended to other firms (mainly the controlling
shareholders) by the listed firm and thus is a good measure of tunnelling. The ratio ‘other
receivables to total assets’ is used as the measure of tunnelling by Jiang et al. (2005), Liu and
Lu (2007), Li (2010) and Jiang, Lee and Yue(2010). Other researchers adopt the difference
between other receivables and other payables divided by total assets as the measure of
financial tunnelling (Guo 2008; Jian & Wong 2003). Meanwhile Gao and Kling (2008)
measure the extent of tunnelling using as proxy the difference between accounts receivable
and accounts payable divided by total assets. This research uses lending to related party
divided by total assets (RPTLendTA) as the measure of tunnelling, which is consistent with
Jiang et al. (2005), Liu and Lu (2007), Li (2010), and Jiang et al. (2010). Cheung et al. (2009)
also suggest that direct cash payment and loan by listed firms to its controlling shareholder
are clear examples of tunnelling. In addition, related parties’ loans are a useful example of
this because they are traceable through public sources, and do not require a ‘fair value’ test,
such as would be needed in other asset transfers between related parties. In terms of
predictors of tunnelling, this study focuses on BE, family ownership (FAMOWN),
managerial ownership (MANOWN) and foreign ownership (FOROWN).
This study uses the Economic Freedom of the World Index (EFWI) published by the
Economic Freedom Network (EFN) as the primary data source for developing respective
measures for the BE 5 . The EFWI measures the degree to which national policies and
institutional influences within a nation are supportive of economic freedom and interaction
(thereby defining the competitive and regulatory environments). An individual nation’s RBE
is defined as the aggregate of LSI and GSI scores, whereas a CBE is a melding of the BRI
and FTI scores. BE is an aggregation of RBE and CBE. For calculation purposes BRI, FTI,
5

The EFWI ranking of 130 nations is the result of a joint venture involving 71 national research institutions and
foundations(Gwartney et al. 2006, p.3). The EFWI summary index is constructed from 42 data points that
measure the degree of economic freedom in five major areas: (1) government size; (2) legal structure and
security of property rights; (3) access to sound money; (4) freedom to trade internationally; and (5) regulation of
credit, labour and business. Four aspects of the EFWI (i.e. legal structure index (LSI), government size index
(GSI), business regulation index (BRI) and freedom to trade internationally index (FTI)) are utilised to represent
the four major theoretical threads underlying corporate governance. The four components selected reflect
specific aspects of regulation and competitiveness that constitutes business environment (BE). Each component
is normalised as a score ranging from zero to ten.
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LSI and GSI score are equally weighted. Mathematically, the calculations of these scores for
nation l are as follows:
RBE_Scorel= [(∑LSIl,2004-2007)/(# Years)*0.5 + (∑GSIl,2004-2007)/(# Years)*0.5)]
CBE Scorel= [(∑BRIl,2004-2007)/(# Years)*0.5 + (∑FTIl,2004-2007)/(# Years)*0.5)]
BE Scorel = (RBE_Scorel + CBE_Scorel)*0.5

[1]
[2]
[3]

The LSI 6 score component of the EFWI is used as a proxy representing the influence
of a nation’s institutional structure on the nation’s RBE. Whereas, to gauge stakeholder
strength that may precipitate a greater need to employ stakeholder management strategies, the
GSI score from the EFWI is used as the relevant proxy7.
The competitive component the BE score is an aggregate of BRI and FTI. The BRI
measures the extent of regulations targeting businesses. BRI with higher scores imply
business regulations are developed to encourage greater market freedom, efficiency and
interaction between market participants. They enhance the ability of the market to solve
principal-agent problems. This study uses the FTI score component of the EFWI as the proxy
for the influence of resource dependence on the CBE. For interpretive purposes a nation with
a higher FTI will enable firms operating in that nation to have a more efficient market for
access key resources, thereby, prompting a stronger CBE.
This study defines family ownership as an individual, or group of family members
who hold more than 25% of firm’s voting rights and is the largest controlling block in the
firm (Achmad et al. 2009; Claessens et al. 2000; La Porta et al. 1999). Therefore, a firm has a
family controlling shareholder if the sum of a shareholder’s direct and indirect voting right is
more than 25%. An arbitrary value 25% of voting rights is used as this is usually enough to
have effective control of a firm (Chernykh 2008; La Porta et al. 1999; OECD 2009). Family
ownership (FAMOWN) is measured by using a dummy variable, one if a firm’s ultimate
owner is family and zero otherwise.
Managerial ownership (MANOWN) is measured by percentage of shares held by
insiders, i.e. CEO and directors (Gao & Kling 2008; Jiang et al. 2010), whereas foreign
ownership (FOROWN) is percentage of shares held by foreign investors both individual and
institutional (Dahlquist & Robertsson 2001; Dow & McGuire 2009; Young et al. 2008). Five
control variables are also used in the model. Based on past studies, the control variables
included are independent directors (IBD), legal origin (LO), size (LNSIZE), the debt ratio
(DEBT), and year dummy variables (Cheung et al. 2009; Doupnik 2008; Gao and Kling
2008; Guo 2008; Johnson et al. 2000; Leuz et al. 2003). The summary of the measurement of
the variables is presented in Table 1.
This research uses several statistical techniques for the data analysis. Descriptive
statistics and univariate statistics including t-Test and ANOVA are employed to enhance the
main analysis. Multiple regression analysis is used as the main statistical test of predictors of
tunnelling.

6

This approach follows prior work (e.g. La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, 2000) emphasising the importance of legal
structure as a relevant barometer of the strength and influence of a nation’s institutional framework
7
Governments, depending on size and strength, can assist in fostering growth of special interest groups whilst
pursuing broader social agendas. A higher score of GSI indicates greater government involvement in the
business environment suggesting heightened stakeholder strength and regulatory efficiency.
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Table 1
Variable Measurement
Variables

Measurement

Type

Dependent Variable
RPTLendTA

Loans to related party divided by total assets.

Continuous

BE Scorel = (RBE_Scorel + CBE_Scorel)*0.5

Continuous

Independent Variables
Business Environment (BE)

Where:
BE : Business environment score.
RBE : Regulatory business environment score.
CBE : Competitive business environment score.
Family Ownership
(FAMOWN)

This variable is measured by using a dummy variable,
“1” if a firm ultimate owner is family and “0” otherwise
(Achmad et al. 2009; La Porta et al. 1999).

Categorical

Managerial Ownership
(MANOWN)

Percentage of shares held by senior managers (board
members and top management).

Continuous

Foreign Ownership
(FOROWN)

Percentage of shares held by foreign investors
(individual and institutional).

Continuous

Independent directors (IBD)

The number of independent directors divided by total
number of board directors.

Continuous

Legal Origin (LO)

Equals “1” if a country follows civil law legal system,
and “0” if a country follows common law legal system.
Countries included in the civil law system are Indonesia
and Philippines, whereas common law system are
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand (Doupnik 2008; La
Porta et. al. 1999).

Categorical

Size (LNSIZE)

Natural logarithm of total assets.

Continuous

Debt (DEBT)

Total debts divided by total assets.

Continuous

Yeardum

Year dummy variables:

Categorical

Control Variables

Yeardum1 : “1” if year 2006 and “0” otherwise.
Yeardum2 : “1” if year 2007 and “0” otherwise.
Yeardum3 : “1” if year 2008 and “0” otherwise.
Yeardum4 : “1” if year 2009 and “0” otherwise.
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Results
Table 2 summarises the descriptive statistics of dependent variables, explanatory variables
and key firm financial data.
Based on Table 2, listed companies have on average loan to related party (RPTLend)
amounts are US$ 14.47 million with minimum value zero and maximum US$ 210 million. Of
200 observations, 27 observations did not indicate loans to related party (RPTLend = 0). The
loans to related party ratio is 3.44 % of total assets (RPTLendTA) on average. The maximum
value is 98.10% and minimum value is 0%. The average ratio is lower compared to 5.47 %
average ratio of Chinese public companies (Li 2010). The BE score for five countries is 6.71
on average which is a moderate level of maximum score at 10. The highest score of BE for
five countries is 8.34 with minimum score 5.68. In regard to family ownership (FAMOWN),
129 (64.5%) cases are categorised as family firm whereas the remaining 71 (35.5%) cases are
considered as non-family firm.
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics (N=200)a
Variables

Mean

Median

Stdev

Min

Max

RPTLend

14,470,000

1,435,000

30,557,000

0

210,000,000

RPTLendTA

0.0344

0.0033

0.1245

0.0000

0.9810

BE

6.7120

6.6408

0.9017

5.6817

8.3358

MANOWN

0.1552

0.0102

0.2387

0.0000

0.7815

FOROWN

0.2331

0.1417

0.2459

0.0000

0.9378

IBD

0.3849

0.3693

0.1430

0.1111

0.9000

Total Assets

1,508,763,989

862,817,591

1,960,058,153

824,236

11,077,000,000

LNSIZE

20.1515

20.5757

1.7929

13.6222

23.1281

Total Liabilities

749,415,930

337,592,492

1,034,197,197

293,331

5,814,269,000

DEBT

0.4740

0.4864

0.2058

0.0348

0.9374

Notes: Table 2 reports statistics descriptive of research variables and some key financial data.
RPTLend =Loan to related parties; RPTLendTA= RPTLend divided by total assets; BE= Business environment; MANOWN= Managerial
ownership; FOROWN=Foreign ownership; IBD=Independent board of director; LNSIZE= Natural logarithm of total assets; DEBT= total
liabilities divided by total assets.
RPTLend, Total assets, and Total liabilities are stated in US dollar.
a
Apart from continuous variables presented above, this study has three categorical variables consisting of family ownership, legal origin
and year dummy. Distribution of family ownership (FAMOWN) comprises 129 (64.5%) family firms and 71 (35.5%) non-family firm;
Legal origin (LO) composition is 80 (40%) cases from civil law countries whereas 120 (60%) cases come from common law countries. A
balance panel of 50 firms each year is used over period 2006-2009 totaling 200 firm-year observations.

Average managerial ownership of five countries is 15.52%, with maximum value at
78.15%. The high percentage of MANOWN for certain firms reveal that top management is
at times also the owner of firms. These conditions are not uncommon in Southeast Asia
countries firms. Foreign ownership has a mean value at 23.31% and a maximum percentage
of 93.78%.
Sample firms have reported percentage of independent directors of between 11.11%
and 90% with an average of 38.49%. This implies that most firms in these five Southeast
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Asia countries have moderate levels of corporate governance practice in term of percentage
of independent directors. Except for the Philippines, the other four countries require a
minimum number of independent directors at one third of the total number of directors. The
composition of the sample is 40% cases from civil law countries compared to 60% cases
from common law countries.
Total assets of 200 firms-years observations range from US$0.82 million to US$11.08 billion
with US$1.51 billion on average. Those numbers show a high standard deviation of total
assets among sample firm (US$1.96 billion). To overcome skewness total assets are
transformed by natural logarithm. Table 2 also shows that the sample has average total
liabilities at US$749.41 million with median at US$337.59 million and leverage (DEBT)
ranging from 3.48% to 93.74% with 47.40% on average.
Comparison of tunnelling activity (RPTLendTA) among the five countries and from
year to year differences is provided in Table 3. ANOVA result shows there is a significantly
different tunnelling (RPTLendTA) among the countries. Average tunnelling (RPTLendTA)
for Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand are 0.0303, 0.0049, 0.0955,
0.0329, and 0.0085 respectively. Tunnelling (RPTLendTA) for the five countries is lower
than one in PRC firms at 0.0547 (Li 2010). The country showing the highest tunnelling
activity (RPTLendTA) is Philippines and the lowest one is Malaysia. Both countries have
different legal systems with Philippines following civil law and Malaysia employing a
common law system. In addition, Philippines has the second lowest BE score among the five
countries after Indonesia. The tunnelling behaviour (RPTLendTA) from year to year does not
demonstrate any statistically significant difference. In 2006 the ratio is 0.0430 and decreases
to 0.0260 in 2007. The ratio increases to 0.0351 in 2008 and slightly decreases to 0.0335 in
2009. There are similar practices over the entire study period.
Table 4 shows Pearson correlation for all research variables. Based on the literature
review and hypothesis development, this study predicts a negative correlation between
tunnelling activity (RPTLendTA) and BE. This study proposes a positive relationship
between tunnelling (RPTLendTA) and family ownership (FAMOWN) and managerial
ownership (MANOWN) whereas tunnelling activity (RPTLendTA) is predicted to have a
negative correlation with foreign ownership (FOROWN). Correlation results show all
directionalities are as predicted. From the table we do not find a strong correlation among
independent variables (highest correlation is between family and managerial ownership at
0.389). This implies that there is little chance of serious multicollinearity problems for the
regression analysis.
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Table 3
ANOVA Tunnelling by Country and by Year
RPTLend TA
Mean
N
F
p- value

Indonesia

Malaysia

Philippines

Singapore

Thailand

2006

2007

2008

0.0303

0.0049

0.0955

0.0329

40

40

40

40

0.0085

0.0430

0.0260

0.0351

0.0335

40

50

50

50

50

3.596

0.156

0.007**

0.926

2009

Notes: Table 3 summarises ANOVA-test of RPTLendTA among five ASEAN countries over the period of 2006-2009 and ANOVA-test of RPTLendTA year by year.
** denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level.

37

AABFJ | Volume 7, no. 2, 2013

Table 4
Pearson Correlation Matrix
RPTLendTA
1

BE

BE

-0.060

1

FAMOWN

0.105

0.147**

RPTLendTA

MANOWN
FOROWN
IBD
LO
LNSIZE
DEBT

0.377

***

-0.072
-0.092
0.187

***

-0.480

***

-0.156

**

0.255

FAMOWN

FOROWN

0.389***

1

***

-0.07

-0.167**

1

***

-0.006

-0.121

-0.017

-0.732

***

0.137

IBD

LO

LNSIZE

DEBT

Yeardum1

Yeardum2

Yeardum3

Yeardum4

1

***

-0.339
0.416

MANOWN

-0.290

***

-0.234

***

0.030

-0.180

**

-0.252

***

-0.361

***

0.036

-0.279

***

0.014

0.271

***

1
-0.295***
0.187

***

1
-0.117

1

0.046

0.054

0.300***

1

Yeardum1

0.040

0.000

-0.03

-0.009

0

-0.039

0

-0.078

-0.029

1

Yeardum2

-0.039

0.000

-0.006

-0.014

0.027

-0.011

0

0.012

-0.04

-0.333***
***

-0.333***

1

-0.333***

-0.333***

Yeardum3

0.003

0.000

0.018

-0.007

0

-0.027

0

0.024

0.046

-0.333

Yeardum4

-0.004

0.000

0.018

0.03

-0.027

0.077

0

0.042

0.024

-0.333***

1

1

Notes: Table 4 displays Pearson correlations of research variables.
RPTLend =Loan to related parties; RPTLendTA= RPTLend divided by total assets; BE= Business environments; MANOWN= Managerial ownership; FOROWN=Foreign ownership; LO=Legal origin which
equals one if civil law legal system and equals zero if common law legal system.D=Indpendent board of director; LNSIZE= Logarithm of total assets; DEBT= total liabilities divided by total assets; Yeardum1:
equal one if year is 2006 and zero otherwise; Yeardum2: equal one if year is 2007 and zero otherwise; Yeardum3: equal one if year is 2008 and zero otherwise; Yeardum4: equal one if year is 2009 and zero
otherwise.
**, ***, significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels (2-tailed) respectively.
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Table 5 reports multiple regression analysis of the relationship among BE, ownership
structure, control variables, and the extent of tunnelling via RPTs. The BE variable does not explain
the extent of tunnelling. This study does not observe empirical evidence about the influence of
family ownership on the extent of tunnelling.
In line with expectations, the regression coefficient for managerial ownership is positive and
statistically highly significant. This finding supports Hypothesis three that predicts a positive
association between managerial ownership and tunnelling via RPTs. This finding suggests that the
higher shareholding by managers increases the potential for the expropriation of minority
shareholders’ rights. Finally, the other ownership variable, i.e. foreign ownership, has no
statistically significant coefficient. Thus, Hypothesis four is rejected.
Among the control variables, legal origin (LO) and firm size (LNSIZE), have statistically
significant positive and negative signs respectively. This is consistent with previous studies that
predict a positive relationship between civil law system and tunnelling. A growing body of research
suggests that civil-law countries are less protective of minority shareholders than common-law
countries (Doupnik 2008; Johnson et al. 2000; La Porta et al. 1999). In regards to firm size
(LNSIZE), this study finds that the lower the total assets, the higher potential of tunnelling. Given
small firms are less likely to have ownership separated from control there could be more
expropriation (Claessens et al. 2000). The three other control variables, i.e. independent boards of
director (IBD), leverage (DEBT) and year dummy, do not help to explain the extent of tunnelling.

Table 5
Multiple Regression Resultsc
Dependent Variable: RPTLendTA
Predictors
t-statistic
Coefficients
0.361
2.776
Intercept
BE
0.015
1.091
FAMOWN
-0.006
-0.331
MANOWN
0.163
4.256
FOROWN
-0.030
-0.939
IBD
0.057
0.959
LO
0.084
3.627
LNSIZE
-0.025
-5.272
DEBT
0.007
0.177
Yeardum1
0.010
0.460
Yeardum3
0.009
0.451
Yeardum4
0.005
0.236
F Statistic
8.891
p-value
R2
0.342
Adjusted R2
0.304

p-value
0.006***
0.277
0.741
0.000***
0.349
0.339
0.000***
0.000***d
0.860
0.646
0.652
0.814
0.000***

Notes: Table 5 reports OLS regression result for 200 firm-year observations.
Dependent variable: RPTLendTA; Independent variables: BE, FAMOWN, MANOWN, FOROWN; Control variables: IBD, LO, LNSIZE, DEBT and
Yeardum1-4.
**, ***, significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels.
c
Similar results are also showed by stepwise regression method.
d
t-test confirms that civil law countries 7.5% much higher RPTLendTA than common law countries 1.5% (p-value 0.047).
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Implications and Conclusion
This study extends empirical tunnelling research which looks at the national corporate governance
level and firms’ ownership structures as determinants of tunnelling behaviour in ASEAN countries.
As the proxy of tunnelling behaviour, loans to related party are employed in light of their potential
ways of expropriation of minority shareholders’ rights. The findings of this study support the
hypothesis concerning the positive link between level of managerial ownership and the extent of
tunnelling.
Hypothesis one regarding the association between BE and tunnelling is rejected. This
finding is not consistent with the arguments that national corporate governance represented by the
BE influences tunnelling behaviour. In regards to institutional theory, the weak institutional
pressures experienced by most Southeast Asian countries may be responsible for this condition.
Such countries generally have good statutory regulations but are weak in implementation and
enforcement (OECD 2009). Therefore, effective regulation is absent. From a stakeholder theory
viewpoint, this finding posits ineffective government involvement in the BE. This is a common
phenomenon of governments in developing countries that struggle to properly manage their
stakeholder expectations. Consequently, they may be disregarded when managing a BE. Moreover,
competition forces do not necessarily create pressures for firms in this region to run efficiently.
Perfect competition as an important assumption in agency and resource dependence theory is not
fulfilled.
Hypothesis two dealing with family ownership influence on tunnelling is rejected. This
finding does not meet the expectation amid concerns that concentrated ownership in the form of
family ownership dominates type of ownership in Southeast Asian firms. Such a condition
potentially increases the opportunities of the controlling family to ‘tunnel’ out wealth from other
shareholders (Claessens et al. 2000; Faccio et al. 2001; Villalonga & Amit 2006).
Hypothesis three is supported. This finding gives empirical evidence that managerial
ownership explains the extent of tunnelling via RPTs. This result is in line with the agency theory
argument that when managers’ shareholdings grow as a fraction of personal wealth, their interest
becomes more aligned with the majority shareholder. This condition implies that minority
shareholders may lose an important monitoring device for good corporate governance.
Consequently, minority shareholders in the five sample countries should be wary of a high
percentage of shareholdings by top management. The finding may also prompt regulators in these
countries to evolve more effective measures and policies protecting the minority shareholders.
This study fails to obtain empirical evidence that foreign ownership is a key governance
mechanism against expropriation behaviour. The presence of many short term foreign investors
(foreign portfolio investment) in emerging markets may partially explain the finding. Short term
investors may only focus on profit taking actions. Such investors may pay less attention about long
term sustainability of firms including potential threat of tunnelling behaviour. Emerging markets are
not yet seen as part of 'normal' investor diversification strategy but rather as markets where higher
risks (relative to developed markets) need to be offset by the possibility of above average gains as
the main motivation for foreign investors to enter emerging markets of developing countries
(WIDER 1990). Furthermore, it is often argued that foreign investors are at an informational
disadvantage relative to local investors (Brennan & Cao 1997; Choe, Kho & Stulz 2005).
Information asymmetries between foreign and local investors are particularly pronounced with
respect to the evaluation of a firm’s governance structure and the scope for expropriation by
controlling insiders (Leuz, Lins & Warnock 2008).
The findings also suggest that common law countries give better protection on minority
shareholders’ rights than do civil law countries. Interestingly, the role of independent directors to
restrain tunnelling behaviour is not supported by evidence in this study. Most firms in these five
countries have satisfied the ‘minimum’ number of independent directors required by their domestic
regulator. However, their conformity may be a formality. This study also documents that firm size
as a control variable has a clear negative association with tunnelling. This implies that small firms
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are more susceptible to tunnelling. The final important finding is that there are no significant
differences of the extent of tunnelling via RPTs prior, during and after the global financial crisis in
these five key Southeast Asia countries.
Given that many of the governance mechanisms proposed in this study, i.e. BE, foreign
ownership, and independent directors, are empirically proven to be ineffective to curb RPT
tunnelling, these findings should raise concerns for current good corporate governance
prescriptions.
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